New York – At The Kosher Supermarket ‘Oif-Shrahbin’ And Its Halachic Implications

New York – We hear it in Boro Park, Willimasburg, Kiryas Joel, Monsey, Jerusalem, and even Far Rockaway. Litvaks will have to forgive the Chassidish spelling and pronunciation of the title of this article. “Shrahb!” (“Write!”) [or in a more practical Yiddish Oif-Shrahbin’] is heard ubiquitously in grocery stores throughout religious Jewish neighborhoods. We hear it from husbands, wives, and even little girls who do the family grocery shopping.

What does it mean? The customer is saying, “Please write down the total grocery bill in your accounts-receivable notebook.”

But what if the family disputes the amount indicated in the grocer’s notebook? What if the father says, “I am sorry, this is not my bill.”

Does he still have to pay?

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 91) deals with the believability of a storekeeper and his notebook. HaRav Shammai Gross, shlita, of Kiryas Belze, author of Shevet HaKehasi, cites the Be’er Hetev (91:16), who rules that a storekeeper is only believed regarding his own accounting; however, when his notebook would require someone else to pay, he does not have believability (Shevet HaKehasi 5:268). The Pischei Teshuvah 91:9 rules in the same manner.

But here, argues the Shevet HaKehasi, the case is different. The customer has already authorized the storekeeper to write down the amounts owed without getting a signature from the customer. In doing so, the customer indicated his willingness to trust the storekeeper.

To answer our question, then, if the father says, “I am sorry, this is not my bill,” he must still pay it. If, however, the customer had previously renegotiated the terms and stated that, for the future, he only authorizes billings that are signed by him or a family member, then he would not have to pay.

The halachos stated above seem quite clear.

However, Rav Gross takes the idea even further, in a controversial ruling that we can take issue with. He writes that if the customer renegotiated the terms and stipulated that the bill is only valid if accompanied by his or a family member’s signature, and the storekeeper wrote down a bill for this customer without the customer’s signature, then the customer is exempt from paying—even if he does not deny taking the items! He further writes that there is no obligation to pay even to be yotzei midinei Shamayim, to fulfill one’s moral obligation. Rabbi Gross claims that it is tantamount to a stipulation that he would not have to pay for these items. Rabbi Gross further states that he presented his conclusions before the rosh yeshiva of the Belze Yeshiva in Israel, Rabbi Shmuel Rosengarten, shlita, and he had agreed with his conclusions.

But this position is highly questionable, because of the laws of ona’as mammon, the principle of overcharging or underpaying. The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 227) rules that when a sale is made at a price above or below market value, the sale is invalid. In our case, when the customer does not have to pay for the items that he took, then this would be considered ona’as mammon—a case of underpaying for items.

If the overcharging or undercharging was more than one-sixth (about 16.7 percent) of the market value, then the sale is deemed invalid (Choshen Mishpat 227:2). In our case, if the customer would not pay at all (as Rav Gross suggests is permitted), he is certainly underpaying by more than one-sixth of the market value, and the sale would thus be deemed invalid. Therefore, if the customer knows that he has taken the items, he must either return the items or pay for them. If he does not know that he has taken the items, but is unsure, then, while it is true that he would not be legally responsible to pay, he does have a dinei Shamayim obligation to pay.

Another question about ona’as mammon is how one can determine the market value of an item in contemporary society, where most items are sold by retail vendors, rather than in the type of marketplace that was common in the times of Chazal. Some authorities have written that since the market conditions have changed so significantly, the idea of ona’as mammon is no longer applicable except in extreme situations (see Pischei Choshen on Choshen Mishpat 227). Other authorities rule that one takes the highest price on the market and calculates one-sixth of that figure.

There are, however, items for which the price is stable in all outlets and, therefore, the principles of ona’as mammon would still apply across the board. A New York Times newspaper still has a set price. If a store would overcharge for the newspaper, that would constitute ona’as mammon.

It should be noted that a store may charge for the additional effort involved in bringing an item to a remote market. Therefore, if a store upstate charges more for a city newspaper, this would not constitute ona’as mammon. It should also be noted that it is even forbidden to overcharge by less than one-sixth, though the transaction remains valid under such circumstances.

In conclusion, we see that a customer who authorizes a storekeeper to write down a bill makes himself liable for any item written down in the storekeeper’s notebook. It might be prudent to insist that it be accompanied by a signature. (Recently, however, new technology has caused this solution to be rather difficult, because many stores have installed computerized systems that will not allow a signature authorization.) It is our further conclusion that if the storekeeper erroneously neglected to demand a signature, the customer is still responsible midinei Shamayim and has a moral obligation to pay the balance of the bill.